Okta • Azure AD • Auth0 • Identity Security
6 million SSO and LDAP records exfiltrated, affecting over 140,000 tenants.
SSO allows users to authenticate once and gain access to multiple applications without re-entering credentials. Instead of managing 50 different passwords, users log in to one identity provider (IdP) that vouches for them across all connected services.
Enterprise SSO, MFA, lifecycle management
Microsoft's cloud identity platform
Developer-friendly SSO with APIs
SSO for Google services + SAML apps
User tries to access corporate app (e.g., Salesforce)
App sends SAML request to Okta/Azure AD
User logs in to IdP (with MFA if enabled)
Signed XML token with user identity and attributes
App verifies signature, creates session, user is logged in
Attacker crafts fake SAML assertion to impersonate legitimate user. Works if IdP's signing key is compromised or signature validation is weak.
Steal SSO session cookie (via XSS, network sniffing) to impersonate authenticated user across all connected apps.
If attacker gains admin access to IdP (Okta, Azure AD), they control ALL user accounts and can access ALL connected applications.
Capture valid SAML assertion and replay it later. Mitigated by short-lived tokens and NotBefore/NotOnOrAfter timestamps.
Intercept SAML response during redirect, modify user attributes (e.g., change role to admin), forward to application.
user.session.start, user.authentication.auth_via_mfaSignInActivity, RiskyUsers, UserRiskEventsSAML assertion received, signature validationIdP redirects, suspicious user-agents| User | Location | IP Address | MFA | Time | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
john.doe@company.com | New York, US | 192.168.1.100 | 10:00 AM | Normal | |
jane.smith@company.com | London, UK | 10.0.0.50 | 10:05 AM | Normal |